howAmericaCouldgodark.pdf

How America Could Go Dark; Dozens of break-insexamined by The Wall Street Journal show howorders to secure the power grid have still left tens ofthousands of utility substations vulnerable to terroristsaboteurs Smith, Rebecca

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ABSTRACT The following year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates the country's interstate powersystem, began requiring that utilities better protect any substation that could disable parts of the U.S. grid if attacked.Major power sources--gas-fired generators and nuclear-power plants, for example--connect to substations that raisevoltages to ferry electricity long distance over a network of power lines. FULL TEXT   An early morning passerby phoned in a report of two people with flashlights prowling inside the fence of an electricalsubstation in Bakersfield, Calif. Utility workers from Pacific Gas &Electric Co. later found cut transformer wires. The following night, someone slashed wires to alarms and critical equipment at the substation, which serves 16,700customers. A guard surprised one intruder, who fled. Police never learned the identities or motive of the burglars. The Bakersfield attacks last year were among dozens of break-ins examined by The Wall Street Journal that showhow, despite federal orders to secure the power grid, tens of thousands of substations are still vulnerable tosaboteurs. The U.S. electric system is in danger of widespread blackouts lasting days, weeks or longer through the destructionof sensitive, hard-to-replace equipment. Yet records are so spotty that no government agency can offer an accuratetally of substation attacks, whether for vandalism, theft or more nefarious purposes. Most substations are unmanned and often protected chiefly by chain-link fences. Many have no electronic security,leaving attacks unnoticed until after the damage is done. Even if there are security cameras, they often proveworthless. In some cases, alarms are simply ignored. The vulnerability of substations was broadly revealed in a Journal account of a 2013 attack on PG&E's Metcalffacility near San Jose, Calif. Gunmen knocked out 17 transformers that help power Silicon Valley; a blackout wasnarrowly averted. The assailants were never caught. The following year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates the country's interstate powersystem, began requiring that utilities better protect any substation that could disable parts of the U.S. grid if attacked.

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FERC's new rule, however, doesn't extend to tens of thousands of smaller substations, including Metcalf and theone in Bakersfield. Security experts say a simultaneous attack on several of these substations also could destabilizethe grid and cause widespread blackouts. Gerry Cauley, head of the North American Electric Reliability Corp., --which writes standards for the grid--was askedat a FERC hearing in June on grid security what kept him up at night. He said the prospect of "eight or 10 vansgoing to different sites and blowing things up." Recovery from a coordinated attack, he said, could take weeks ormonths. The Metcalf substation, while undergoing security upgrades, was hit again in August 2014. Intruders cut throughfences and burglarized equipment containers, triggering at least 14 alarms over four hours. Utility employees didn'tcall police or alert guards, who were stationed at the site, according to a state inquiry. Three days after the break-in, Stephanie Douglas, PG&E's senior director of corporate security, sent a memo to theutility's president saying security was in a fail mode, and her department lacked clout and resources: She had 26full-time jobs to protect 900 substations, as well gas pipelines and other utility assets. Ms. Douglas, no longer with PG&E, declined an interview request. PG&E spokesman Matt Nauman said the utilityhas responded with a $200-million program that includes better security equipment, more training and hiring. The sprawling U.S. electric system is regulated by government but mostly owned and operated by utility companiesand grid operators that monitor electricity supply and demand every minute, every day. The system is always on--and for years few thought anyone would try to turn it off. The motive of most substation break-ins appears to be theft. Intruders and, potentially, terrorists also could be tryingto hack into control systems through computer equipment in substations--either to cause immediate damage or togather information for later use. "A substation is not an obvious target for criminals like a bank," said Joseph Weiss, a security consultant to utilities."Common sense says they want to get into the electric system." Complex system The U.S. power grid is like a giant puzzle that can be configured in different ways to deliver power where and when itis needed. Major power sources--gas-fired generators and nuclear-power plants, for example--connect to substations that raisevoltages to ferry electricity long distance over a network of power lines. At cities and other destinations, substationslower the voltage to safely deliver electricity to homes and businesses. Substation computers help grid operatorscontrol those electrical flows. The grid was cobbled together during the electrification of the U.S. over the past 125 years. It is a fragile,interdependent system generally more vulnerable in summer when it is running closer to its limits. It is also at riskduring low-demand periods, when power-plant operators and linemen perform maintenance. Fewer plants andtransmission lines operating mean fewer options for delivering electricity during emergencies. There is so much variability in the grid that what causes a catastrophe one day might not the next, which makes

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security issues complex. Small problems can quickly spiral out of control. On Sept. 8, 2011, equipment problems and human error caused a large transmission line in Arizona to trip out ofservice. The grid is supposed to withstand the loss of any one line. On this day, electric current shifted to nearbylines and overloaded them; that overtaxed transformers at two small substations, which shut down defensively toprevent equipment damage, and disruptions spread. San Diego was blacked out 11 minutes later. Traffic snarled. Flights were canceled. Raw sewage flowed into theocean. Altogether, 2.7 million utility customers lost power in California, Arizona and Mexico. Federal officials have long known about the vulnerability of electrical substations. A 1990 report from the federalOffice of Technology Assessment warned that "virtually any region would suffer major, extended blackouts if morethan three key substations were destroyed." A 2012 report from the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences looked at different parts ofthe electric system and concluded that substations were "the most vulnerable to terrorist attack." "We've known we had an issue for a long time and have been very slow to do anything about it," said M. GrangerMorgan, a professor of engineering at Carnegie Mellon University who studied the San Diego blackout. Security adviser James Holler said his company, Abidance Consulting, inspected nearly 1,000 substations over thepast year for utilities in 14 states. "At least half had nothing but a padlock on the gate," he said. "No cameras. Nomotion sensors or alarms." One utility lost a set of substation keys that were in a truck stolen for a joy ride. After the truck and keys wererecovered, Mr. Holler said, the utility didn't change the substation locks. Richard Donohoe, director of security for the consulting firm Black &Veatch, said the security departments of utilitycompanies are often so low in the pecking order that "the rest of the organization ignores them half the time." After the gunfire attack on the Metcalf substation, FERC required enhanced protection for individual substations"that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability," or cascading blackouts in any of thethree separate sections of the U.S. power grid. That is a high bar. Utility experts aren't sure how many substations the new rules cover but estimate it is fewer than350 out of approximately 55,000. They say more protections are needed at smaller substations that could triggerblackouts if attacked in combination. The exact combinations depend on energy demand and the direction of electricity flow. In spring, for example,hydroelectric power plants send electricity from the Pacific Northwest to California. In winter, electricity flows in theopposite direction, mostly from gas-fired and nuclear power plants in California and Arizona. One security-focused nonprofit group called the Foundation for Resilient Societies has called for an analysis of theimpact of simultaneous attacks, both physical and cyber. Thomas Popik, chairman of the group, told FERC in June that existing grid protections were inadequate and hisgroup believed the grid was "a battlefield of the future" that required military-type defenses for key infrastructure.

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Michael Bardee, director of the Office of Electric Reliability at FERC, said the agency could do more to study securityvulnerabilities at the thousands of substations not covered by the new rule. FERC expects a progress report on thenew rule later this year. "Clearly, there's some sense that as events go on we may need to re-evaluate the applicability of this standard," Mr.Bardee said, and possibly expand its reach. The Vermont Electric Power Co. approved a $12 million program to beef up security at 55 locations after substationswere penetrated more than a dozen times by thieves stealing copper during break-ins from 2012 through early 2014. "We haven't seen a theft in over a year," said Kerrick Johnson, a spokesman. The utility installed more securefencing and better security cameras. Most utilities are reluctant to spend money on security unless under government orders. They must justify theirexpenses to regulatory agencies to pass on the costs to ratepayers, said John Kassakian, an emeritus professor ofelectrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Security upgrades generally include cameras, lights and motion sensors, as well as password-controlled doors andgates that electronically monitor entries and exits. Terror threats, Mr. Kassakian said, probably seem less pressingthan spending to comply with federal environmental rules. Alarms unheeded Utilities don't always report attacks despite a legal requirement to notify the Energy Department within six hours ofany event that could interrupt electricity or if a break-in targets security systems. No utility has been fined for failing to comply as far as he knew, said David Ortiz, deputy assistant secretary at theEnergy Department: "I don't have an enforcement team." The Journal found nine substation break-ins over the past two years where theft wasn't the apparent motive. Thetally and details of the break-ins were gleaned from interviews and public records requests. The count includedattacks affecting the federally owned Liberty substation in Buckeye, Ariz. The substation, about 35 miles west of Phoenix, is a critical link in the southwest power corridor, delivering electricityto heat homes in northwestern states during winter and cool buildings in the southwest during summer. On Nov. 5, 2013, someone slashed fiber-optic cables that serve Liberty, as well as the larger Mead substation nearHoover Dam. It took workers about two hours to re-establish proper communications and normal controls. Liberty is operated by the Western Area Power Administration, which controls 17,000 miles of high-voltage powerlines used by utilities serving 40 million people in 15 states. If this system suffered a catastrophic failure, it wouldtake down other utilities with it, experts said. Alarms signaling trouble at Liberty began ringing at a utility operations center in Phoenix 13 days after thecommunications outage. Dozens of alarms sounded over two days before an electrician was dispatched.

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The electrician expected a false alarm. Instead, he found the perimeter fence sliced open and the steel door to thecontrol building "peeled back like a sardine can," said Keith Cloud, the utility's head of security. The substation's computer cabinets were pried open. The substation's security cameras proved useless: eight of 10were broken or pointed at the sky, Mr. Cloud said. Most had been out of operation for a year or more. Two months later, on Jan. 30, 2014, Liberty was hit again. Two men with a satchel cut the gate lock and headed tothe control building. They left after trying, unsuccessfully, to cut power to a security trailer outfitted with cameras andblinking lights, which were installed after the first break-in. This time, Mr. Cloud said, utility officials found 16 of 18 security cameras had failed. Most were installed after thefirst break-in and hadn't been properly programmed. Investigators retrieved a single fuzzy video from a thermal-imaging camera. Mark Gabriel, WAPA's administrator, said the utility has "taken steps to improve our physical security program andprocesses," including creating the security department in 2013 that Mr. Cloud now heads. A federal audit faulted WAPA in April for violations of security regulations, including broken or obsolete equipment,lax control over keys to critical substations and failure to install intrusion-detection systems. Mr. Gabriel said WAPA spends a couple of hundred million dollars on capital improvements annually, which includesmoney for security improvements. "The bigger story is how that break-in and others in the industry changed thethinking," he said. Mr. Cloud said he has received about $300,000 for security upgrades at a handful of WAPA's 328 substations,including Liberty. To protect the system's 40 most important substations and control centers, he said, he needs $90million: "I don't have the authority or budget to protect my substations." Write to Rebecca Smith at [email protected] Credit: By Rebecca Smith DETAILS

Subject: Electricity distribution; Electricity; Public utilities; Electric utilities; Cameras; Blackouts;Security management; Nuclear power plants; Electric currents

Business indexing term: Subject: Public utilities Electric utilities; Corporation: Pacific Gas &Electric Co;Industry: 22112 : Elect ric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution

Location: United States--US; Bakersfield California; California

Company / organization: Name: North American Electric Reliability Corp; NAICS: 813910; Name: Pacific Gas&Electric Co; NAICS: 221122; Name: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission--FERC;NAICS: 926110, 926130

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LINKSGet It At Liberty

Classification: 22112: Electric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution

Publication title: Wall Street Journal (Online); New York, N.Y.

Pages: n/a

Publication year: 2016

Publication date: Jul 13, 2016

Section: Page One

Publisher: Dow Jones &Company Inc.

Place of publication: New York, N.Y.

Country of publication: United States, New York, N.Y.

Publication subject: Business And Economics

e-ISSN: 25749579

Source type: Newspaper

Language of publication: English

Document type: News

ProQuest document ID: 1803543226

Document URL: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/liberty.edu?url=https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/how-america-could-go-dark-dozens-break-ins/docview/1803543226/se-2?accountid=12085

Copyright: (c) 2016 Dow Jones &Company, Inc. Reproduced with permission of copyright owner.Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

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Last updated: 2023-03-02

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